quarta-feira, 24 de setembro de 2008

ainda alguém se lembra da LTCM?, ou, business as usual

«[...] Long-Term Capital Management opened for business in February 1994 with $1.25 billion in funds. Armed with the cachet of its founders' stellar credentials (Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, 1997 Nobel Prize laureates in economics, were among the partners), it quickly parlayed expertise at reading computer models of financial markets and seemingly limitless access to financing into stunning results. By the end of 1995, it had tripled its equity capital and total assets had grown to $102 billion. [...]»

(Amazon.com: When Genius Failed)

«[...] So LTCM bet big, very big. [...] LTCM's partners quickly included every bank on Wall Street and many of Europe's premier banks as well. They built up a fund of $100 billion. Which meant that they could really put some money down. And they made spectacular profits for a while. Until the pressure to keep achieving led to increasingly risky speculations and less protected gambles. When the markets in Brazil, Indonesia and Russia all crashed within months of each other it was as if a wrecking ball had ploughed through LTCM. But because they had continued to leverage their investments at very high multiples the effect was shared throughout the world's banks. When LTCM went down it threatened to open up a trillion-dollar black hole, a financial abyss that could have busted a continent and an entire banking system. [...]»

(Amazon.co.uk: When Genius Failed)

«[...] In late September 1998, the New York Federal Reserve Bank invited a number of major Wall Street investment banks to enter a consortium to fund the multibillion-dollar bailout of a troubled hedge fund. No sooner was the $3.6-billion plan announced than questions arose about why usually independent banks would band together to save a single privately held fund. The short answer is that the banks feared that the fund's collapse could destabilize the entire stock market. [...]»

(Amazon.com: When Genius Failed)